University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

English Language and Literatures, Department
of

Summer 1995

Kings and counselors: the politics of Francis Bacon's rhetorical
theory
Christopher Holcomb
University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/engl_facpub
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Publication Info
Published in Philological Quarterly, Volume 74, Issue 3, Summer 1995, pages 227-247.
Holcomb, C. (1995). Kings and counselors: the politics of Francis Bacon's rhetorical theory. Philological
Quarterly, 74(3), 227-247.
Copyright © 1995 University of Iowa.

This Article is brought to you by the English Language and Literatures, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Kings and counselors: the politics of Francis
Bacon's rhetorical theory
Philological Quarterly , Summer 1995
Late in March of 1603, just before and immediately after Elizabeth's death, Francis Bacon was scrambling to
secure for himself a position in the service of the Queen's successor, James VI of Scotland.(1) Two days before
her death, Bacon offered his services to Burghley and the Earl of Northumberland, who both had been
corresponding confidentially with the King on the question of the succession. After the Queen's death, he wrote
to three of James' courtiers, known to him through his brother Anthony, to one "Mr. Davys," who had set out to
meet the new King upon his entrance into England, and to the King himself. In his letters to James' courtiers and
Mr. Davys, Bacon's theme was the same: "furdering a good conceit and impression of [his] most humble duty
and true zeal towards the King." In his letter to James, Bacon himself offers his service and makes "oblation of
[himself] to your Majesty."(2) The reason for Bacon's scrambling can be deduced from the fact that since 1593,
when he delivered a speech in Parliament that had offended the Queen, the path to his preferment had been
effectively blocked.(3) In the meantime, several positions had been dangled before his nose, but they were all
snatched away by a crotchety Queen.(4) However, now that the question of succession had been settled, his
path seemed relatively open, and he therefore concentrated his energies to make his way along it.
Receiving an encouraging reply from Northumberland, Bacon wrote to him again, but this time he included with
his letter something that, if not handled properly, could do much damage to his suit. What he enclosed was a
draft of a Proclamation "drawn for the King at his entrance." Bacon explains the purpose of the draft in the letter:
I do hold it a thing formal and necessary for the King to forerun his coming (be it ever so speedy) with some
gracious declaration, for the cherishing, entertaining, and preparing of men's affections. For which purpose I
have conceived a draught, it being a thing in my Mistress' times to have my pen used in public writings of
satisfaction.(5)
The Proclamation, then, is ostensibly intended to anticipate the King's coming and ingratiate him into the hearts
of the people. However, as the letter continues, Bacon's statements become more tendentious. He suggests to
Northumberland that the draft can be used in two ways. First, it can be used "properly,"
if your Lordship think convenient to shew the King any such draught; because the veins and pulses of this state
cannot be but best known here; which if your Lordship should do, then I would desire you to withdraw my name,
and only signify that you gave some heads of direction of such a matter to one of whose style and pen you had
some opinion.
Second:
though your Lordship make no other use of it, yet it is a kind of portraiture of that which I think worthy to be
advised by your Lordship to the King ['to express himself according to those points which are therein
conceived'].(6)
These uses combined give two contradictory representations of Bacon. Still present is Bacon's desire to perform
his "humble duty." He shows deference to Northumberland by presenting his uses as options, not as directives;
he thus locates the power to choose whether to use the Proclamation or not with Northumberland. Also, Bacon's
wish to have his name withdrawn is a self-effacing move (which could nevertheless lead to his possible

identification: although he does not want to appear too presumptuous, there is perhaps the hope that being
signified as the "pen" of "some opinion" will pique the interest of the King and thus prompt Northumberland to
mention Bacon's name). Finally, if Northumberland should decide not to deliver the declaration to the King, he
will at least have a useful model upon which to base his counsel to James. However, Bacon's claim that state
matters "cannot be but best known here" presupposes a lack of knowledge on the part of James (and
Northumberland), an inadequacy that Bacon aims to remedy. If he should ever fulfill this aim, then Bacon will be
in a position to control and determine James' perception of what are and what are not the important matters of
state. Also, as the word "portraiture" implies, the Proclamation is designed to fashion an image of James
according to what Bacon thinks most appropriate. On the one hand, then, Bacon hopes to be of service both to
the King by easing his entrance and to Northumberland by supplying him with appropriate matter for advising the
king. On the other hand, Bacon betrays a desire to control, not only what knowledge of public matters is
disclosed to the king, but also the first image that the people of London will have of James as King of England.
In the Proclamation itself, the same contradictory impulses are present. On the one hand, it was written, not only
to "forerun" the King's coming, but also to anticipate and preclude any disorder in the realm that might result from
the succession.(7) Bacon attempts to achieve the latter purpose in a highly rhetorical manner. King-Bacon
repeatedly praises his new subjects for their obedience and loyalty: he describes "her Majesty's peaceable and
quiet government . . . [as] accustoming the people to all loyalty and obedience"; he commends the "quietness
and obedience of our own people"; and he takes comfort in the fact that "our loving subjects . . . received and
acknowledged us their natural and lawful king . . . in so quiet and settled manner."(8) By praising and
characterizing them as such, he presents them with a model of behavior that, though it might not actually be the
case, he wishes to make the case. In "Of Praise," Bacon describes this strategy and calls it laudando praecipere
(to teach by praising): "by telling men what they are, [praises] represent to them what they should be."(9)
Praising is not just an acknowledgement or a submission to the virtues of the object of praise, it is also a gesture
of control: in this instance, the rhetorical presentation of an obedient populace is meant to secure and sustain
their compliance.
On the other hand, there are aspects of the Proclamation which work against the maintenance of the status quo.
Thus, a modified version of the tactic of laudando praecipere can be used to describe the rhetorical dynamics
occurring between Bacon and the King, assuming, that is, that James would ever read the draft. Bacon writes the
Proclamation in the first person plural (using the royal "we") as if the King himself were speaking. By assuming
the persona of the King, Bacon is, in a sense, telling James what he is, manufacturing a rather flattering ethos
which, if the Proclamation should be delivered, would not only represent to James what he should be, but also
constitute the identity presented by him to his new subjects.
The ethos, or "portraiture," produced presents James as a reverent, unambitious, charitable, just, peaceable, and
unostentatious king. King-Bacon shows the proper respect to the recently deceased Elizabeth, praising her as a
"virtuous and excellent Queen," wishing that her days could have been "prolonged," and assuring his subjects
that there never "appeared in us any ambitious or impatient desire to prevent [i.e., to come ahead of] God's
appointed time." He is also a disinterested and charitable sovereign who does "not take so much gladness and
contentment in the devolving of these kingdoms unto our royal person, for any addition or increase of glory,
power, or riches," as in the God-granted power "to reward our friends and servants . . . to comfort and relieve the
hearts and estates of our people and loving subjects, and chiefly to advance the holy religion and church of
Almighty God." In regard to international policy, he promises not "to espouse . . . our kingdom of England to any
quarrel or war, but rather . . . to preserve them in peace and tranquility." And finally, King-Bacon refers to himself
"not only [as] a just and gracious sovereign lord and king, but [also as] a special and bountiful patron and
benefactor," who will "maintain every several estate in a happy and flourishing condition."(10) Even though the
ethos produced by these statements might look good on James, it is nevertheless an image created by Bacon. It
allows Bacon a vicarious control over James which may actually benefit him materially as well as psychologically

if James lives up to King-Bacon's word and does, in fact, "reward our friends and servants," chief among whom
one must member Francis Bacon, of course.(11)
Thus, within the Proclamation we find the opposing motives of service and control (or, rather, rule).(12) The
Proclamation is written in the service of the King and of order; it is designed to create a virtual presence of the
King in order to fill the power vacuum left after the Queen's death and thus to discourage sedition. Through the
King it would reinforce the order of the realm both by asserting his presence and by praising the people for their
obedience and tranquility. However, the Proclamation also performs an act of disorder; for the space of the draft,
Bacon usurps the place of the King. And though the image produced commends the virtues of James, it also
betrays a desire to command him.(13) Bacon simultaneously assumes the positions of both ruled and ruler.
Bacon's scrambling for a place in the service of James and his offer to provide the King with a Proclamation have
much to do with rhetoric, both Renaissance rhetoric in general, and Bacon's conception of it in particular. His
correspondence with the courtiers of the King, his letter to James himself, and the Proclamation are all motivated
by Bacon's desire to serve the new King and, by implication, to serve order. However, that desire to serve can
easily slide into a desire to rule. In the Proclamation, Bacon fashions an ethos or role for the King so that, should
the King decide to use the declaration, he would have to submit himself to that manufactured identity as well as
consent, at least for the time being, "to express himself according to those points which are therein conceived."
This double and contradictory pull between the motive to serve and the motive to rule is, I will argue, at the heart
of Bacon's theoretical conception of rhetoric.
Many recent studies of Bacon have examined the politics implicit in his "new science," his consideration of other
philosophical issues, his Essays, and his imaginative writings.(14) However, historians of rhetoric have failed to
observe the politics that inform his definition and theory of rhetoric. Instead, they do a number of other things
with Bacon's treatment of the subject. Many classify it under the headings of psychology, or philosophy, or
both.(15) By contrast, others construct Bacon as a great innovator whose conception of rhetoric is a "prophecy of
things to come," or one who, if he is not granted the status of prophet, is, at least, "not in the tradition of
Elizabethan and early Jacobean rhetoric."(16) Both of these approaches lift Bacon's rhetoric up and out of his
own historical locality and place it either amidst the so called "philosophical" rhetorics or in the realm of "things to
come." The net effect is that Bacon's construction of rhetoric is assumed to be in itself politically indifferent, not
subject to the same ideological pressures and preoccupations (such as with social advancement) that permeated
his public life.(17) However, Bacon's definition and discussion of rhetoric is, in fact, highly political. While it
affirms the official ideology of a fixed social order, it also invests rhetoric with a power which subverts that order.
Because rhetoric is granted such a power, Bacon prescribes and limits its proper use. His principal strategy is to
allegorize the rhetorical exchange itself in such a way that every exchange conserves the social hierarchy and
right rule.(18) However, even in the very allegory he constructs rhetoric retains an inescapable potential to
disrupt the established order and usurp the sovereign's authority and power. This simultaneous affirmation and
subversion of order is not unique to Bacon's construction of rhetoric but shares features in common with other
Renaissance rhetorics, as well as with Bacon's more explicitly political writings.(19) We will find that the
instability just described is located primarily in the relationship between the sovereign and those figured in the
treatments of rhetoric as orator-counselors, a position Bacon aspired to and eventually came to hold.
For Bacon, rhetoric governs a transference of images and information between the faculties of the mind. He
defines its end as the translation of "the dictates of the reason to the imagination, in order to excite the appetite
and will." Or, formulating it slightly differently, he says, "the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination with
observations and images, to second the reason, and not to oppress it."(20) Defined thus, Bacon's rhetoric seems
only to describe an operation performed by a disembodied art on disembodied mental faculties, a
characterization which is clearly responsible for leading critics to celebrate Bacon's theory as a breakthrough in
the psychology of rhetoric.(21) However, when Bacon goes on to characterize what this transaction entails, the

operation of rhetoric looks less like a psychological process, and more like a political one. In fact, he likens the
rhetorical exchange to the quelling of a political upheaval:
[I]f the affections themselves were brought to order, and pliant and obedient to reason, it is true there would be
no great use of persuasions and insinuations to give access to the mind, but naked and simple propositions and
proofs would be enough. But the affections do on the contrary make such secessions and raise such mutinies
and sedition . . . that reason would become captive and servile, if [the] eloquence of persuasions did not win the
imagination from the affection's part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against
them.(22)
The affections are likely to "make such secessions and raise such mutinies and sedition" against reason
because they lack the foresight of the latter:
For it must be observed that the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to apparent good, and have this in
common with the reason; but the difference is that affection beholds principally the good which is present; reason
looks beyond and beholds likewise the future and sum of all. And therefore the present [because it fills] the
imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished and overcome. But after eloquence and the force of
persuasion have made things future and remote appear as present [then the imagination goes over to the side of
reason, and renders it victorious].(23)
These two passages are remarkably suggestive. By a series of metaphorical translations,(24) the political realm
is conflated with the realms of rhetoric and the mind. In other words, the mental faculties are distributed into a
three-tiered social structure with the sovereign at the top, the populace at the bottom, and a middle class in
between whose identity and composition, as we shall see, varies in Bacon's thought, sometimes to be equated
with the nobility and sometimes with counselors and advisors (like Bacon himself).(25) The faculty of reason,
because its dictates ultimately govern the action of the will (that is, if rhetoric functions as it should), and because
it is vulnerable to "secessions," "mutinies," and "sedition," may be interpreted as a sovereign. The affections
represent a potentially unruly populace that needs to be "brought to order."(26) And the imagination, which, filled
with rhetoric, operates in that ambiguous space between reason and the affections, shifting its loyalties from one
to the other, is figured as an indeterminate middle class.
The middle figures in Bacon's political allegory, the imagination and rhetoric, are problematic: they are both
necessary and dangerous. Without the imagination, the lines of communication between the mind and reality and
between the reason and the will would break down.(27) "For sense sends all kinds of images over to the
imagination for reason to judge of; and reason again when it has made its judgment and selection, sends them
over to the imagination before the decree be put in execution" - that is, before the imagination delivers the
decree of reason to the will. Thus, the imagination performs the office of an ambassador ("legatio"), or orator,
working in the service of the sovereign reason and carrying messages to the will.(28) However, the imagination
is also dangerous; it can ally itself with the affections, and together they can overthrow reason and gain control of
the will. In "Of Sedition and Troubles," Bacon describes a similar danger occurring in the political realm:
There is in every state (as we know) two portions of subjects, the noblesse and the commonalty. When one of
these is discontent, the danger is not great: for common people are of slow motion if they be not excited by the
greater sort; and the greater sort are of small strength except the multitude be apt and ready to move of
themselves. Then is the danger, when the greater sort do but wait for the troubling of the waters amongst the
meaner, that then they may declare themselves.(29)
Just as the nobility and the commonalty may band together and rebel, so may the imagination and the affections.

Whether the imagination serves reason (and thus order), or whether it, together with the affections, mutinies
against reason (and thus causes disorder), depends ultimately on whether rhetoric functions as Bacon says it
should. If rhetoric is functioning properly, it seconds reason and does not oppress it. And if the affections and the
imagination should raise a sedition, then the first object of rhetoric is to fill the latter with goods "future and
remote" and draw it to the side of reason, rendering the latter "victorious." Thus rhetoric, if it is working in the
service of reason, maintains stability, order, and the proper distribution of power within the mind; furthermore, it
crushes the first signs of rebellion. In short, rhetoric, functioning as it should, works in the service of rule.
But what if rhetoric malfunctions; that is, what if it behaves in ways contrary to Bacon's prescriptions? That it has
the capacity to do so is inscribed in the definition itself. Rhetoric is not a possession of the sovereign reason; in
fact, the rule of reason depends on rhetoric, for without its aid, the reason is impotent. By itself, reason can only
offer "naked and simple propositions and proofs" which are ineffective in bringing the affections to order; only
rhetoric has the power to make the affections "pliant and obedient." The implication, then, is that an errant
rhetoric will "fill the imagination with observations and images," not to second the reason, but to oppress it, and
that the imagination will go over to the side of the affections, and together they will riot. Bacon himself allows for
such a possibility:
[The imagination] usurps no small authority in itself. . . . [It] may come to rule [over reason] in [its] turn. . . . And
again it is no small dominion which imagination holds in persuasions that are wrought by eloquence; for when by
arts of speech men's minds are soothed, inflamed, and carried hither and thither, it is all done by stimulating the
imagination till it becomes ungovernable, and not only sets reason at nought, but offers violence to it.(30)
An ambitious imagination, filled with persuasions, soothes or inflames the affections, carries them "hither and
thither," and finally usurps the place of the sovereign reason. Thus the imagination, armed with rhetoric, can itself
rule.
That Bacon's conception of rhetoric betrays contradictory impulses - the desire either to serve the established
order or disrupt it by usurpation - locates his treatment of it securely in the Renaissance.(31) Usually in their
prefatory matter, many Renaissance writers of rhetorics acknowledge the established order by including a
re-telling of the Ciceronian myth, in which rhetoric is described as the force that created society and as the glue
that holds it together.(32) Without the force of eloquence, Thomas Wilson implies, man would have forever
"waxed sauage" and been "all against order."(33) However, also found in these rhetorics is a desire to disrupt
order, sometimes even in the same Ciceronian myths that construct rhetoric as a civilizing force. In Wilson's
version of the myth, for instance, he claims that God gave his "appointed Ministers . . . the gift of vtterance, that
they might with ease win folk at their will, and frame them by reason to good order." Wilson then rocks the very
foundations of that "good order" when he asks: who would "digge and delue," "tauaile and toyle," and "aduenture
and hassarde his life" for a King's pleasure, if he had not been persuaded to do so?(34) In other words, Wilson
suggests that we have all been duped into subjection by rhetoric.(35)
Richard Rainolde's re-telling of the myth is another version that both affirms and subverts the established order;
it also shares several features with Bacon's political allegory. Rainolde does not recreate the myth in its entirety;
rather, his version picks up after the savage world has been tamed and society has been established by
eloquence. He says, "Nothyng can bee more excellently giuen of nature then Eloquence, by which the florishyng
state of commonweales doe consiste: kyngdomes universally are gouerned, the state of euery one priuatlie is
maintained." Then, using famous orators from the ancient world as models for his own time, he says that they
were a "great bulwarke and staie to Athens and all Greece[.] Rome also by the like vertue of Eloquence, in
famous and wise orators [was] upholded." He concludes, "a common wealth or kingdome must be fortified, with

famous, graue, and wise cousailours [i.e., orators]." Rainolde then delivers a brief narrative which recounts how
Demosthenes, with a "goodly Oracion," repulsed the attempted invasion of Athens by Philip of Macedon.(36)
Rainolde's metaphors and story suggest that rhetoric supports, maintains, and defends the order and stability of
the commonwealth.
The orator-is-fortification metaphor and the story about Demosthenes imply that the orator, as the defender of
the commonwealth, occupies an intermediary position: as fortification he stands between the state and its
invaders. However, in addition to being positioned between the kingdom and its invaders, the orator is also
situated interstitially in the social hierarchy between the populace and prince, a position which gives him
subversive potential. This potential comes out when Rainolde says that orators are to
drawe unto them the hartes of a multitude, to pluck doune and extirpate affeccio[n]s and pertubations of the
people . . . [as well as to] speake before Princes and rulers, to perswade them in good causes and enterprises,
to animate and incense them, to godlie affairs and business, to alter the cou[n]sail of kynges.(37)
Clearly, orators are positioned above the multitude, keeping them compliant and orderly, but their position in
relation to the princes is dangerous. In terms of social status, they are below the princes; however, in terms of
their powers of persuasion, they are above them - and hence have the ability to turn the social order topsy-turvy
by ruling their rulers.
These passages taken from Rainolde read very much like Bacon's political allegory. Just as the imagination,
filled with rhetoric, is to bring the disorderly affections to obedience, so are orators to "pluck doune and extirpate
affectio[n]s and pertubations of the people." Also, both the imagination and orators are portrayed as intermediary
figures, operating between the sovereign reason and princes, on the one hand, and the affections and people,
on the other. It is the intermediary status of the imagination and orators that makes them both ambiguous.
Bacon's imagination is ostensibly subordinate to reason, yet it has the capacity to usurp the position of the
sovereign and gain absolute control of the mind's will. Similarly, Rainolde's orators are presumably subjects of
their princes, but when he claims that they persuade, animate, incense, and alter princes to various actions, an
inversion occurs and princes becomes the subject of the persuasions of the orators. That is, in both Bacon and
Rainolde, rhetoric as rule always threatens to displace the (legitimate) ruler it serves.(38)
Rhetoric is thus contradictory and threatening. Ostensibly, it is to be employed in the service of rule as a
stabilizing force. However, rhetoric is given the power to destabilize the relationship between the ruler and the
ruled, in particular, between the sovereign and his orator-counselors. These conflicting roles assigned to rhetoric
reflect a more general contradiction that characterizes the social experience of the ambitious man in sixteenthand early seventeenth-century England, an experience that many Renaissance rhetoricians shared.(39) The
predicament of the ambitious man is defined by a fundamental contradiction: his vested interest in the
maintenance of status hierarchy, yet his need to disrupt it. On the one hand, the man seeking advancement to a
place of privilege and power in the social hierarchy must acknowledge, by implication, the validity of that
hierarchy and the order it represents. On the other hand, to win privilege and power, the socially ambitious must
transgress the very boundaries that demarcate and keep distinct each social place. Once across a boundary, he
must cover the tracks of his mobility because, while he is trying to make his way up the social ladder, the
established nobility is trying to kick him back down. In order to conceal the rupture he has made and show his
membership in the ruling class, he adopts their style and mannerisms; and, in order to prevent further class
contamination and dispersal of privilege, he blocks the advancement of others. Thus the ambitious man is
confused by competing motives: he hopes that the social hierarchy is sufficiently fluid so that advancement may
be possible in the first place; and yet he desires to preserve the rigidity of the social hierarchy so that, once
advanced, he can enjoy the power that place traditionally confers.(40) Although the competing impulses

assigned to the imagination and orator-counselors, in Bacon's writings, are more polarized than those assigned
to the ambitious man, their trajectories are the same.
By investing rhetoric with the power to preserve and disrupt the established order, Renaissance rhetoricians, in
effect, write into their theories the possibility of their own advancement, but at the cost of duplicating the
competing motives just described. Rhetoric as service holds each social position in place; however, rhetoric as
rule promises to move the ambitious man up the social scale, theoretically, even into the seat of rule itself. The
orator-counselor position is unstable: it presupposes both the counselor's desire to serve as well as his
knowledge and a certain inadequacy on the part of the sovereign. Thus, by virtue of the information that he
possesses and that the king wants, power is conferred on the counselor, a power which puts a strain on the
normal relationship between the socially superior king and his socially inferior counselor. If enough torque is
applied, the power relationship could theoretically flip. To alleviate this strain and stabilize the act of advising,
most rhetorical theorists, including Bacon, insist upon the superiority of the king. Nevertheless, as we shall see,
such attempts to preserve the status quo inevitably fail because of the inherent ambiguity of the counselor's
position. Indeed, that ambiguity even makes him look like a deceiver, tricking his sovereign into thinking he rules
when the counselor is really in charge.
Let us look briefly at what is recommended by Puttenham, as a representative of the rhetorical tradition in the
Renaissance, before we move on to Bacon whose meditations on counsel repeat and elaborate that tradition in
subtle and remarkable ways. One way to preserve the superiority of the king is to invoke the power relation
inscribed in the social hierarchy. George Puttenham says, "in matters of aduice it is neither decent to flatter [a
Prince] for that is seruile, neither to be rough or plaine with him, for that is dangerous."(41) Here the social
hierarchy provides the basis for the principle of decorum, and it is used to stabilize the act of advising a prince,
first by reaffirming the positions of those involved and, second, by ensuring that they stay put. By neither
flattering nor being "rough and plaine," the advisor affirms his own position (above those who are "servile") as
well as the superiority of the prince. He also keeps each participant in his place, preventing the advisor from
slipping into a position of servility or from assuming a position above the prince. In short, the principle of decorum
is here applied in order to preserve the status quo. Puttenham's discussion of the levels of style and how they
should be used in speaking or writing about princes offers another good example in which decorum is used as a
strategy for reinforcing the status quo, that is, social stratification: "[I]n speaking or writing of a Princes affairs and
fortunes there is a certaine Decorum, that we may not use the same termes in their busines, as we might very
wel doe in meaner persons, the case being all one, such reuerence is due to their estates."(42) However,
decorum may be observed, not to preserve the social hierarchy, but as an expedient to win some other end.
After saying that it is improper both to flatter a prince and be "rough and plaine with him," Puttenham introduces
an example in which a counselor uses decorum as a pretense to gain control over a prince: "Cineas Counsellour
to king Pirrhus . . . kept that decencie in all his persuasions [i.e., he neither flattered Pirrhus nor was rough and
plain], that he euer prevailed in aduice, and carried the king which way he would."(43) By giving his advice the
appearance of preserving the power relation inscribed in the social hierarchy - that is, "decencie" - Cineas was
able to invert it and lead king Pirrhus "which way he would."(44)
As Puttenham's prescriptions and example suggest, the act of giving advice to a superior presupposes a
distribution of power that inverts the normal, appropriate, or legitimate one. In order to alleviate the strain, the
inappropriate distribution must be made to seem like the appropriate one, but the instability of the act persists:
even if an inversion of power is not necessarily the goal of the counselor, it is nevertheless always present as a
possibility. Bacon has his own model for counseling that is similarly designed to alleviate strain and impose
stability, but, as with Puttenham, it is ambiguous and unstable. However, its ambiguity and instability focuses, not
on social status and decorum, but on the bodies of both the king and his counselors.
Bacon's essay "Of Counsel" begins with a statement that is meant to answer the objection that counsel threatens

to invert the established order between a king and those beneath him - in this case, his counselors. "The wisest
princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon
counsel."(45) Bacon goes on to argue that kings need counselors for the effective management of state affairs,
and, in order to stabilize the potentially disruptive effects of giving advice, he invokes a power distribution
inscribed in a myth involving both a marital and a sexual relationship:
The ancient times do set forth in figure both the incorporation and inseparable conjunction of counsel with kings,
and the wise and politic use of counsel by kings: the one, in that they say Jupiter did marry Metis, which signifieth
counsel; whereby they intend that Sovereignty is married to Counsel: the other in that which followeth, which was
thus: They say, after Jupiter was married to Metis, she conceived by him and was with child, but Jupiter suffered
her not to stay till she brought forth, but eat her up; whereby he became himself with child and was delivered of
Pallas armed out of his head.
Counsel is expressed in terms of, and is stabilized by, an institutionalized social relationship, marriage, a
relationship that maintains the proper distribution of power: the masculine king holds dominion over his feminized
counselor. More interesting, though, is Bacon's interpretation of the myth in which he specifies the "politic use of
counsel by kings." Here he prescribes a "remedy" for the potential "weakening of the [king's] authority":
[This] monstrous fable containeth a secret of empire; how kings are to use of their counsel of state. That first
they ought to refer matters unto them, which is the first begetting or impregnation; but when they are elaborate,
moulded, and shaped in the womb of their counsel, and grow ripe and ready to brought forth, that then they
suffer not their counsel to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it depended on them; but to take
matter back into their own hands, and make it appear to the world that the decrees and final directions . . .
proceeded from themselves.(46)
The eroticization of the rhetorical exchange between counselors and kings is figured in such a way that it affirms
the authority and power of kings over their counselors. What Bacon calls "the first begetting or impregnation"
characterizes the exchange as one of invasion and occupation: a king penetrates his counselors and fills them
up with "matter." After the "matter" has been "moulded" and "shaped," yet before its delivery, the king then takes
it "back into [his] own hands," and thus appropriates the power of the counselors to bring an idea to fruition. The
motive for doing so is to preserve the power imbalance which the act of giving counsel threatens to upset.
However, at the very moment Bacon affirms the authority of the kings, he undermines it, first by showing their
dependence on counselors, and second, by exposing the basis of their authority as trickery. The king
appropriates the generative powers of the counselors by an act of ingestion: after inseminating his counselors,
the king eats them. In one respect, this is an act of absolute domination and control - the incorporation of one
body into another. However, once the counselors are ingested, the king is himself filled and occupied; whereas
once the king impregnated his counselors, now they literally fill him up as they nourish and sustain him. Bacon's
interpretation of the myth thus reveals the king's mastery to be a form of dependency. Moreover, it also identifies
the king as a trickster. For when the king eats his counselors, he swallows the evidence of his own dependency.
That is, he eats his counselors so that it will "appear to the world that the decrees and final directions . . .
proceeded from" himself (my emphasis). In other words, the king plays a trick on his counselors and subjects.
However, by proposing such a model of counsel, publishing it in an essay, and thus making it public knowledge,
Bacon creates a situation which undermines the trickery of kings and shows whoever reads his essay that their
power to deliver "decrees and final directions" depends ultimately on the fecundity of their counselors.
In "Of Counsel," kings are both tricksters and dependent on their counselors only because Bacon says so. That
is, Bacon's description of the trickery and dependency of kings is his own interpretation of the myth, and a highly

self-interested interpretation at that.(47) Bacon himself was a member of the Learned Counsel, nominally under
Elizabeth, properly under James;(48) he thus had a vested interest in how the position of counselor was
constructed. By interpreting counselors as indispensable to kings, he argues not only for the importance of
counselors, but also for the continuation of that position. Bacon, in effect, ensures the maintenance of his own
social position by writing it into his interpretation. We saw a similar strategy at work in the constructions of
rhetoric we have already examined. The investment of rhetoric with so much power is a projection of the
rhetoricians' own desires for an advancement that leaves the social hierarchy intact. The instability of the
orator-counselor figure speaks to the fact that rhetoric is simultaneously the servant of rule and rule itself.
Bacon's rhetoric is not a disembodied art operating on disembodied mental faculties, nor is it politically
indifferent. As we saw, in the allegory he uses to define the operation of rhetoric, the role assigned to the
imagination possesses the same instability that he, as a man seeking advancement, shows himself to possess in
writing the Proclamation for the King, and that other Renaissance rhetoricians assign to orators in general.
Rhetoric is constructed as reinforcing the established order, on the one hand, and as subverting it, on the other.
In his essay "Of Counsel," this instability is expressed in terms of the bodies of both kings and their edible
counselors.
As a conclusion, let us look briefly at Bacon's letter offering his service to James, which was mentioned in
passing at the beginning of this essay, for in it the contradictions between service and rule are present, and the
orator-counselor's desire for power over his sovereign appears in a striking image of the body which both
continues and inverts the images in "Of Counsel." The letter ostensibly is an "offer of service to his Majesty . . .
upon his first coming in," but the means by which Bacon tries to persuade the King to accept this offer involves a
remarkable construction of the King's body.(49) In the first part of the letter, giving the reasons why Bacon felt
encouraged to offer his service "immediately to your Majesty," he makes reference to that body, describing it as
permeable and open to access. James' "person is not inclosed for a few." Rather, he is endowed with the "royal
virtue of access, which nature and judgment have planted in your Majesty's mind as the portal of all the rest."
Bacon was also encouraged by "a supposal that unto your Majesty's sacred ears (open to the air of all virtues)
there might perhaps have come some small breath of the good memory of my father," Nicholas Bacon, the late
Lord Keeper. That James' "person is not inclosed," but open to "access" and that his ears are also are open to
"air" and "breath" evoke the imagery of Bacon's myth of Metis in which kings penetrate their counselors.
However, in the letter, it is Bacon who hopes to penetrate the open body of the King. In other words, the letter
intimates the fantasy of power at the heart of the oratorical enterprise in the Renaissance: while James is making
his entrance into his new country, Bacon will be making his entrance into the King, impregnating, impersonating,
and dominating him. Bacon's imagery reveals the profound desire of the orator-servant to be the master of his
master.
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Abstract
English author Francis Bacon's letters to the courtiers of King James VI before the monarch succeeded Elizabeth
I reveals his concept of rhetoric as a tool for political advancement. Bacon wrote several letters to gain the king's
confidence, in which he expressed his intent to portray the king in the most positive light to his subjects once he
enters England and assumes the throne. The letters are remarkable in the way they suggest that Bacon can
create a persona for the king through the power of rhetoric, since Bacon includes the draft of a speech which he
hoped would be used by the king in a public appearance.
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